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Abstract: Nudges are increasingly being proposed and used as a policy tool
around the world. The success of nudges depends on public acceptance.
However, several questions about what makes a nudge acceptable remain
unanswered. In this paper, we examine whether policy alternatives to nudges
inﬂuence the public’s acceptance of these nudges: Do attitudes change when
the nudge is presented alongside either a more paternalistic policy alternative
(legislation) or a less paternalistic alternative (no behavioral intervention)? In
two separate samples drawn from the Swedish general public, we ﬁnd a very
small effect of alternatives on the acceptability of various default nudges
overall. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that when the alternative to the nudge is
legislation, acceptance decreases and perceived intrusiveness increases (relative
to conditions where the alternative is no regulation). An implication of this
ﬁnding is that acceptance of nudges may not always automatically increase
when nudges are explicitly compared to more paternalistic alternatives.
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1
The idea that barely noticeable changes in how choice alternatives are pre-
sented (i.e., nudges) can help people to make better decisions is viewed as a
promising policy option by many. Nudges, such as strategic use of default
rules, are therefore increasingly being proposed and used as a policy tool by
government agencies around the world (Whitehead et al., 2014; Halpern &
Sanders, 2016). Compared to more traditional policy tools such as mandates
and taxes, nudges are typically viewed as less paternalistic. Still, ethical con-
cerns have been raised that the use of nudges is manipulative and thereby
not as liberty preserving as it is often portrayed (e.g., see Bovens, 2009;
Hausman & Welch, 2010; Whitman & Rizzo, 2015). This debate has
spurred research exploring if and when individuals judge nudges as acceptable
and nonintrusive to freedom of choice (Hagman et al., 2015; Jung & Mellers,
2016; Sunstein, 2016; Reisch et al., 2017; Sunstein et al., 2017; Loibl et al.,
2018). Overall, these studies have shown that the acceptability of the use of
nudges in public policy tends to be moderate to high across most countries.
Common to these studies, however, is that they have not considered that the
(un)stated policy alternative (i.e., legislation or no regulation) is likely to
affect the evaluation of acceptability. A nudge intervention might seem like a
good idea in the abstract, but be less appealing when placed in context.
Conversely, the appeal of a nudge intervention may only become apparent in
the context of a worse alternative. For instance, when judged separately
from any salient alternative, a default intervention intended to increase
organ donation may seem paternalistic. However, when compared to the alter-
native of legislation that all must donate their organs, the nudge intervention
may now appear as a very good alternative. Put differently, preference reversals
are likely to occur when nudges are evaluated in the context of an alternative
(joint evaluation) compared to in isolation (separate evaluation; see Bazerman
et al., 1992; Hsee et al., 1999). Here, we explore the extent to which attitudes
toward the use of nudges in public policy are affected by stated alternatives to
that nudge.
Understanding when and why people judge nudges as acceptable or not is
critical since any public policy necessitates some level of public support in
order to achieve its objective (Page & Shapiro, 1983; Tannenbaum et al.,
2017). Moreover, nudges may backﬁre and lead to adverse effects on the
type of behavior they are trying to promote if they are implemented despite
a lack of public support (Arad & Rubenstein, 2017). When exploring what
aspects inﬂuence attitudes toward nudges, several conceptual distinctions
that affect attitudes toward nudges have been highlighted. For example,
nudges categorized as pro-self (i.e., focusing on enhancing private welfare)
are preferred to nudges that are categorized as pro-social (i.e., focusing on
enhancing social welfare; Hagman et al., 2015). Similarly, nudges that target
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reﬂective or conscious thinking are viewed as more acceptable compared to
nudges that play on individuals’ intuitive thinking (Felsen et al., 2013; Jung
& Mellers, 2016; Sunstein, 2016). Nudges that are educational and make
information more salient are also preferred compared to nudges that take
advantage of peoples’ inattention and laziness (Sunstein, 2017a).
In addition to exploring general attitudes, some studies have also explored
the extent to which individual differences in worldviews/values systematically
inﬂuence nudge attitudes. Surprisingly, political afﬁliation is generally a weak
predictor of attitudes toward nudges (Reisch & Sunstein, 2016). Some evi-
dence, however, suggests that people with a ‘communitarian worldview’ are
more likely to exhibit positive nudge attitudes compared to those with a
more individualistic worldview (Hagman et al., 2015). Similarly, people who
score high on libertarian values are also more likely to disapprove of nudges
in public policy (Jung &Mellers, 2016). Such ﬁndings are in line with theories
in social psychology suggesting that people with a more pronounced individu-
alistic worldview should be increasingly resistant to external control and thus
be less accepting of policies that can be seen as infringements of autonomy
(Kahan & Braman, 2006).
Common to all previous studies that have explored attitudes toward nudges is
that they have not explicitly speciﬁed what, if any, the alternative policy
approach is. Information about the relevant policy alternative will arguably
inﬂuence attitudes toward nudge interventions. We argue that evaluations con-
cerning the acceptability and intrusiveness of nudges are made just as we make
other judgments in life, where the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of an outcome often is
evaluated relative to a reference point (Slovic et al., 2002; Kahneman, 2011).
More speciﬁcally, we believe that making the more paternalistic alternative
(e.g., legislation) salient will make nudges appear more appealing (i.e., more
acceptable and less intrusive). Similarly, the use of nudges should appear as
less appealing when it is compared to a policy that claims to effectively change
nothing. This prediction is based on research by Sunstein (2017) that reports
data from a direct test of approval of nudges (default rule with an opt-out
option) versus legislation (making mandatory) for three initiatives: savings,
safe sex education and education about intelligent design. Approval for
nudges over legislation differed by 32–50%, with a majority always preferring
nudges. Thus, nudges appear to be more accepted than bans because “mandates
and bans face objections that do apply to nudges. Because people care about
agency and want to maintain it, they will be skeptical of initiatives that eliminate
it, even as they acknowledge that in some domains, coercion is amply justiﬁed”
(Sunstein, 2017, p. 32). Sunstein points out that many oppose legislation as such,
but that for nudges people have no general view, but instead construct attitudes
based on the information contained in the nudge itself.
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Thus, we predict that explicitly stating information about policy alternatives
will inﬂuence the extent to which nudges are viewed as acceptable and
nonintrusive. This prediction is also in line with a recent study by Davidai
and Shaﬁr (2018), who found that people are less likely to endorse nudges
when alternative nudges are presented simultaneously (joint evaluation)
rather than separately (separate evaluation). In two studies conducted
using representative Swedish samples, we explore the extent to which
attitudes toward nudges systematically change when presented alongside a
more paternalistic policy alternative (legislation) and a less paternalistic
alternative (no regulation). We predict that nudges presented with a more
paternalistic alternative will have greater acceptability and be perceived as
less intrusive compared to the same nudge presented with a less paternalistic
alternative. We examine this prediction for both pro-social and pro-self
nudges. In general, we expect that pro-self nudges will be seen as more
acceptable and less intrusive than pro-social nudges. Because of this, we
predict that the effect of a given alternative will be greater for pro-social
nudges. In addition, we also explore how individual differences depend on
people’s worldview and inﬂuence the malleability toward the use of nudges
in public policy.
Study 1
Method
Sample and materials
A web-based survey administrated by CMA Research (a data collection
company) was sent to a diverse sample of the adult Swedish population
(aged 20–75 years). In total, 608 participants completed the survey (52.7%
female, mean age 41.4 years). Thirty-three participants did not complete the
full survey and were included in the analysis of overall acceptance, but were
not included in the analysis of individual differences. The sample was drawn
from a representative pool of the general population in Sweden with slightly
greater income and education than average. Participants received a small
amount of monetary compensation (approximately US$1.50) for completing
the survey.
The survey started with a general introduction that informed participants
that behavioral interventions in public policy are becoming increasingly
common and that the goal of the survey was to assess opinions among the
general public about such interventions. All participants were then presented
with a series of experimental tasks in which four nudge scenarios were included
(in a random order).
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All of the scenarios are shown in Box 1. Each of these scenarios involved the
strategic use of a default rule (i.e., changing opt in to opt out) in a speciﬁc policy
area. The nudge scenarios were chosen to represent key policy areas and to
include a common type of nudge intervention presented in the nudge literature
(e.g., see Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Sunstein, 2017b; Szaszi et al., 2017). The
scenarios followed the same basic structure. The ﬁrst sentence presented the
policy issue at hand and was then followed by a description of a suggested
nudge intervention that involved strategic use of a default rule. Next, the
intended goal of the intervention was stated (e.g., “the goal of this intervention
is to increase the number of individuals who are organ donors”).
Box 1. Nudge scenarios translated from Swedish.a
Organ donation (pro-social nudge)
There is a lack of organ donors in Sweden. In order to become an organ
donor, it is now required that the individual him- or herself makes an
active choice and announces his/her will to the healthcare service. If no
active choice is made, the individual is assumed to not want to donate any
organs in case of an accident. Studies have shown that many people want
to register as donors, but few people actually do so. A proposed intervention
to increase the number of organ donors is that everyone is automatically
registered as organ donors. This means that people who do not want to
be organ donors must actively contact the healthcare service and state
that they would like to unregister.
The goal of this intervention is to increase the number of individuals who
are organ donors.
[The alternative to this intervention is to do nothing at all to increase the
number of individuals who are organ donors.]
{The alternative to this intervention is to introduce legislation that makes
everyone an organ donor without the possibility to unregister.}
Climate compensation (pro-social nudge)
Carbon dioxide emissions in connection with air travel have a negative
impact on the climate. To compensate for this negative impact, there is
usually a voluntary climate compensation fee that airline travelers can
choose to pay. This fee goes to projects aimed at reducing carbon dioxide
emissions corresponding to the emissions caused by the air travel. If no
active choice is made, the individual is assumed to not want to pay the
climate compensation fee. Studies have shown that many people want to
climate compensate when they travel, but few people actually do so. A
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proposed intervention to increase the number of people that climate com-
pensate is that compensation is included in the price when you buy the
journey. This means that people who do not want to pay the compensation
fee must actively contact the travel agency and state that they do not want to
pay the fee.
The goal of this intervention is to increase the number of individuals who
compensate for air travel.
[The alternative to this intervention is to do nothing at all to increase the
number of individuals who compensate for air travel.]
{The alternative to this intervention is to introduce legislation that makes
it mandatory to pay a compensation fee for air travel.}
Retirement savings (pro-self nudge)
Most Swedes save too little for their retirement today, which can lead to a
difﬁcult ﬁnancial situation when getting older. Individuals today must make
an active choice to save extra for their retirement. If no active choice is made,
it is assumed that the individual does not want to save extra for their retire-
ment. Studies have shown that many people want to save more for retire-
ment, but few people actually do so. A common way to increase your
retirement savings is to spend a greater part of the salary on retirement
savings. A proposed intervention to increase individuals’ retirement savings
is to automatically increase the amount selected for retirement with each
wage increase. This means that people who do not want to increase the
amount selected for retirement with each wage increase must contact their
employer themselves and state that they do not want to increase retirement
savings.
The goal of this intervention is to increase individuals’ retirement savings.
[The alternative to this intervention is to do nothing at all to increase indi-
viduals’ retirement savings.]
{The alternative to this intervention is to introduce legislation that makes
it mandatory to increase the amount selected for retirement with each wage
increase.}
Cancer screening (pro-self nudge)
In Sweden, there are many who die from cancer who could have survived if
the cancer had been discovered earlier. To get a cancer screening, it is now
necessary for the individual to make an active choice and book a cancer
screening themselves. If no active choice is made, it is assumed that the indi-
vidual does not want to get a cancer screening. Studies have shown that many
people want to get screened for cancer, but few people actually do so. A
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proposed intervention to increase the number of people who participate in
cancer screenings is that everyone is automatically called to a cancer screen-
ing in the year they turn 40. This means that people who do not want to be
called for a cancer screening must actively contact the healthcare service and
state that they do not want to be called for a cancer screening.
The goal of this intervention is to increase the number of individuals who
get screened for cancer.
[The alternative to this intervention is to do nothing at all to increase the
number of individuals who get screened for cancer.]
{The alternative to this intervention is to introduce legislation that makes
it mandatory to get a cancer screening.}
a The alternative is added to the control condition in [] for the no-regulation
condition and in {} for the legislation-as-alternative condition.
Following each scenario, respondents were asked: Acceptability: “Do you ﬁnd the
described policy acceptable?” (yes or no), and Intrusiveness: “Do you think that
the described policy restricts the individual’s freedom of choice?” (yes or no).
These measures are our main dependent variables in the subsequent analyses.
In order to measure individual differences related to ideological worldview,
we included the Cultural Cognition Short Scale (Kahan, 2014), which mea-
sures whether individuals are more or less prone to an individualistic or com-
munitarian worldview (e.g., “The government interferes far too much in our
everyday lives”) and the grid subscale with six items (1–4 Likert scale) measur-
ing whether individuals are more or less prone to a hierarchical or egalitarian
worldview (e.g., “Our society would be better off if assets were more evenly dis-
tributed”). Participants also answered the decision-style scale (Hamilton et al.,
2016), which measures the extent to which individuals make intuitive versus
analytical decisions. The rational subscale had ﬁve items (1–5 Likert scale;
e.g., “I prefer to gather all of the necessary information before committing to
a decision”), and the intuitive subscale also had ﬁve items (1–5 Likert scale;
e.g., “I rely on my ﬁrst impressions when making decisions”). Additional mea-
sures included a measure of conﬁdence in the present Swedish government
(1 (not at all)–5 (completely), with the possibility to answer that they did not
care about the subject) and political orientation (1 (far to the left)–7 (far to
the right)) along with measures of age, gender and education.
Experimental design
The participants were randomly allocated to one of three conditions
(legislation as alternative, no regulation and control) in a between-subjects
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design. Table 1 shows the numbers of participants and demographics by
condition.
In the legislation-as-alternative condition, the participants were informed
that the alternative to the suggested intervention was to introduce legislation
to enforce a certain behavior instead of merely encouraging it. Moreover, par-
ticipants were informed that if the default change was not accepted, then legis-
lation would be adopted.
In the no-regulation condition, participants were informed that the alterna-
tive to each suggested intervention was “to do nothing at all” to encourage the
behavior. Furthermore, participants were explicitly informed after each scen-
ario that if the intervention was not accepted, then nothing else would be
done to solve the problem that the intervention was designed to handle.
In the control condition, participants were only informed that this survey
was performed in order to measure the public’s attitude toward different inter-
ventions to increase various behaviors. No additional information about alter-
natives to the intervention was given.
Based on Hagman et al. (2015), two nudge policies were classiﬁed a priori as
pro-social (organ donation and climate compensation) and two nudge policies
were classiﬁed as pro-self (retirement saving and cancer screening).
Results and discussion
Effects of alternative conditions
The answers to each of the four scenarios were summed to create a rate of
acceptance measure ranging from 0 (not accepting any of the nudges) to 4
(accepting every nudge). An intrusiveness rate measure was created in the
same way. Figure 1 presents the effect of alternatives across all four scenarios.
A χ2-test was conducted to examine whether there was any difference in the
proportion of participants that accepted the nudge (acceptance rate) between
the alternative conditions. Across conditions, no signiﬁcant difference for
acceptance rate was found (χ2(8) = 8.78, p = 0.361). However, intrusiveness
ratings differed between conditions (χ2(8) = 16.49, p = 0.036), such that the
legislation-as-alternative condition was judged by more participants to be
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of participants for each condition.
Control No regulation Legislation as alternative Total
n 219 209 213 641
Female 58% 53% 47% 53%
Mean age (years) 41.1 41.0 42.5 41.4
8 W I L L I A M H A GM A N E T A L .
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
intrusive than both the no-regulation condition and control conditions
(Figure 2). Thus, we ﬁnd no effect of our main manipulation on acceptability
when we had expected that the legislation-as-alternative manipulation would
be the nudge condition accepted by most participants. We also expected that
the nudges in the legislation-as-alternative manipulation would be seen as
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Figure 1. Acceptance rates of nudges divided by condition. Error bars are 95%
conﬁdence intervals.
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Figure 2. Intrusiveness rates of nudges divided by condition. Error bars are
95% conﬁdence intervals.
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the least restrictive by a majority of the participants. Instead, we ﬁnd the oppos-
ite result.
Effects of pro-social versus pro-self domain
The two scenarios a priori categorized as pro-self were more accepted (M =
1.41, n = 631) than pro-social scenarios (M = 1.29, n = 629) (χ2(4) = 48.81,
p < 0.001). Furthermore, pro-self scenarios were perceived as less intrusive
(M= 0.76, n = 631) than pro-social scenarios (M= 0.89, n = 629) (χ2(4) = 69.95,
p < 0.001).
Figures 3 and 4 present the acceptance and intrusiveness rates across the
alternative conditions and pro-social/pro-self nudges. As can be seen, there
are no interactions and the overall pattern from our main ﬁndings holds for
both pro-social and pro-self domains.
Effects of individual differences
In order to investigate individual factors that affect acceptance rates, a multiple
regression was conducted (Table 2). In the regression, a dummy variable for the
no-regulation condition (1/0) and legislation-as-alternative condition (1/0) and
a dummy for higher education (1/0) were included along with control variables
for age, gender, individualism, egalitarianism, intuitive and rational decision
style, political orientation and conﬁdence in the government.
The results show that 12.4% of the variance could be explained with two
variables (F(11, 584) = 7.505, p < 0.001) where the acceptance rate was
lower for more individualistic participants (β = –0.082, p < 0.001) and more
egalitarian participants had a higher acceptance rate (β = 0.051, p = 0.001),
with no other signiﬁcant effects for the other variables.
A similar analysis was run for intrusiveness (Table 3). That analysis showed
that 7.1% of the variance could be explained with three variables (F(11, 584) =
4.036, p < 0.001) where the intrusiveness rate was higher in the legislation-as-
alternative condition (β = 0.228, p = 0.048) and the intrusiveness rate was
higher for more individualistic participants (β = 0.060, p < 0.001) and more
egalitarian participants had a lower intrusiveness rate (β = –0.040, p = 0.019),
with no other signiﬁcant effects for the other variables.
We expected that more individualistic respondents would be more accepting
of nudges in the legislation-as-alternative condition (to avoid the legislation)
and less accepting when the alternative was to do nothing (no-regulation con-
dition). Separate regressions for each condition show that respondents who
scored higher on the cultural cognition worldview group scale (i.e., those
who are more individualistic) are signiﬁcantly less accepting of the nudges in
both the control condition (p = 0.003) and in the no-regulation condition
(p < 0.001). However, this was not the case for the legislation-as-alternative
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condition (p = 0.106). Furthermore, respondents who scored higher on the cul-
tural cognition worldview grid scale (i.e., more egalitarian) were signiﬁcantly
more accepting of nudges in both the control alternative condition (p =
0.022) and in the no-regulation condition (p = 0.008), but not in the legisla-
tion-as-alternative condition (p = 0.300). Regarding the other individual
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Figure 3. Acceptance rates of pro-social and pro-self nudges divided by
condition. Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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Figure 4. Intrusiveness rates of pro-social and pro-self nudges divided by
condition. Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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difference measures, no systematic pattern emerges. For judged intrusiveness,
more individualistic respondents ﬁnd the nudges to be signiﬁcantly more
restricting to freedom of choice in the no-regulation condition (p = 0.025),
but not for the other conditions. These results suggest that both individualists
and egalitarians are affected by the presented alternative.
Table 2. Linear regression analyses exploring the inﬂuences of individual
differences on acceptance rates.
Conﬁdence interval
β (standardized) p-valueβ Lower bound Upper bound
No-regulation (dummy) –0.110 –0.321 0.100 –0.046 0.303
Legislation (dummy) –0.196 –0.404 0.011 –0.083 0.064
Higher education (dummy) –0.083 –0.260 0.095 –0.037 0.361
Female –0.066 –0.248 0.116 –0.029 0.478
Age –0.006 –0.012 0.001 –0.071 0.073
Individualism –0.082 –0.111 –0.053 –0.249 <0.001
Egalitarian 0.051 0.021 0.082 0.154 0.001
Rational decision style 0.027 0.000 0.055 0.080 0.054
Intuitive decision style 0.015 –0.011 0.042 0.047 0.259
Political orientation 0.029 –0.041 0.099 0.039 0.421
Conﬁdence in the government 0.021 –0.067 0.109 0.022 0.641
Table 3. Linear regression analyses exploring the inﬂuences of individual
differences on intrusiveness rates.
Conﬁdence interval
β (standardized) p-valueβ Lower bound Upper bound
No-regulation (dummy) 0.004 –0.114 0.223 0.001 0.974
Legislation (dummy) 0.228 –0.226 0.454 0.092 0.048
Higher education (dummy) 0.042 0.002 0.235 0.018 0.671
Female –0.135 –0.152 0.064 –0.057 0.183
Age 0.002 –0.333 0.009 0.018 0.662
Individualism 0.060 –0.006 0.091 0.172 <0.001
Egalitarian –0.040 0.028 –0.007 –0.112 0.019
Rational decision style –0.006 –0.073 0.024 –0.017 0.681
Intuitive decision style 0.014 –0.037 0.043 0.041 0.347
Political orientation 0.000 –0.015 0.077 0.000 0.994
Conﬁdence in the government 0.012 –0.076 0.108 0.012 0.807
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In summary, Study 1 showed, in contrast to our hypothesis, that there was
no difference in acceptance when we provided explicit information about the
alternative, and there was a difference in the unexpected direction for perceived
intrusiveness to freedom of choice. How can this result be understood? Before
addressing other possible theoretical explanations, we must address a potential
methodological limitation: that the manipulation of alternatives was not strong
enough. Given the prevalence and strength of effects of alternatives documen-
ted elsewhere in the judgment and decision-making literature (e.g., Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Fredrick et al., 2009; Hsee &
Zhang, 2010; Kahneman, 2011) there are good reasons to think that our
manipulation should have worked as intended. However, given the lack of
effect of our manipulation, we conducted a direct replication in Study 2 that
included manipulation checks as well as different dependent variables (interval
scales instead of binary choices) for both acceptance and intrusiveness.
Study 2
Sample and materials
A web-based survey administrated by the same data collection company as in
Study 1 was sent to a diverse sample (different from Study 1) of the adult
Swedish population (aged 18–65 years). In total, 962 participants completed
the survey (54.9% female, mean age 41.3 years). The sample was drawn
from a representative pool of the general population in Sweden, with slightly
higher income and education than average. Participants received a small mon-
etary compensation (approximately US$1.50) for completing the survey. The
survey for Study 2 had the same experimental design and nudge scenarios as
in Study 1, with the addition of an attention check and a manipulation
check and a new response format for the two main dependent variables.
Moreover, participants answered the same worldview and decision-style
scales as in Study 1. Information about age, gender and education was also col-
lected. Table 4 shows the demographics for each condition.
Following each scenario, respondents were asked to rate: (1) acceptability:
“Do you ﬁnd the described policy acceptable?” where the participants could
circle any number between –3 (totally unacceptable) and 3 (totally acceptable);
and (2) intrusiveness: “Do you think that the described policy restricts the indi-
vidual’s freedom of choice?” with a –3 (totally unrestricting) to 3 (totally
restricting) format. These measures are our main dependent variables in the
subsequent analyses.
In addition, we measured attitudes toward the goal of the intervention (“Is it
desirable to achieve to goal of x?” 1 (not at all)–5 (very) with a possibility to
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answer that they did not care about the subject). Here, an attention check was
administrated with the same response format (the participants were given a
number they should provide in order to show that they were attentive). The
central manipulation check to assess whether the alternative manipulation
was successful consisted of the question “What was the alternative given to
the suggestion you have answered in this survey?” with the possibility to
answer: “No alternative was given” (correct in the control condition), “The
alternative was to do nothing to affect people’s behavior” (correct in the no-
regulation condition) or “The alternative was to introduce legislation to
affect people’s behavior” (correct in the legislation-as-alternative condition).
As can be seen in Table 4, a majority of the participants in the legislation-as-
alternative condition (72%) passed the manipulation check, whereas fewer
passed the manipulation check for both the no-regulation condition (36%)
and the control condition (20%). In the subsequent analyses, we therefore
include pass/fail on the manipulation check as a between-subjects variable.
Results and discussion
Effects of alternative conditions
The answers for each of the four scenarios were added together to create a sum
of acceptance measures ranging from –12 (very unaccepting) to 12 (very
accepting). An intrusiveness sum measure was created in the same way.
Figure 5 presents the effect of alternatives on acceptance across all four
scenarios. A two (manipulation check; passed or failed) by three conditions
(control, no regulation, legislation as alternative) analysis of variance was
conducted to examine whether there was any difference in acceptance rate
between the alternative conditions. A main effect across conditions was
found with a signiﬁcant difference for acceptance rate (F(2, 686) = 9.855,
p < 0.001, η = 0.028), where the no-regulation condition had the highest
acceptance rate (n = 227, M = 4.61, SD = 4.58) with the control condition
(n = 230, M = 4.50, SD = 4.64) in the middle and the legislation-as-alternative
condition with the lowest acceptance rate (n = 235, M = 3.28, SD = 4.82).
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of participants for each condition.
Control No-regulation Legislation-as-alternative Total
n 230 227 235 692
Correct on manipulation 20% 36% 72% 43%
Female 55% 54% 55% 55%
Mean age (years) 41.4 41.1 41.3 41.3
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A Sidak post-hoc test shows that the participants in the legislation-as-alterna-
tive condition were signiﬁcantly less accepting compared to both the control
condition (mean difference: –1.98, p < 0.001) and the no-regulation condition
(mean difference: –1.76, p = 0.001), and there is no difference between the
other conditions (mean difference: 0.223, p = 0.960). A signiﬁcant main
effect of the manipulation check was also found for acceptance rate
(F(1, 686) = 5.812, p = 0.016, η = 0.008), where participants who answered
correctly on the manipulation check in general had a greater acceptance rate
(M = 4.26, SD = 4.69) compared to participants who answered incorrectly
(M = 4.02, SD = 4.74). No signiﬁcant interaction effect between condition
and manipulation check was found (F(2, 686) = 2.824, p = 0.060, η = 0.008).
Figure 6 presents the effects of alternatives on intrusiveness across all four
scenarios. A main effect across conditions was found with a signiﬁcant differ-
ence for intrusiveness rate (F(2, 686) = 6.349, p = 0.002, η = 0.018), where the
no-regulation condition had the lowest intrusiveness rate (n = 227, M = –2.18,
SD = 4.84) with the control conditions (n = 230, M = –2.08, SD = 4.81) in the
middle and the legislation-as-alternative condition with the highest intrusive-
ness rate (n = 235, M = –0.82, SD = 4.91). A Sidak post-hoc test shows that
the participants in the legislation-as-alternative condition rated the scenarios
as signiﬁcantly more intrusive compared to both the control condition (mean
difference: 1.686, p = 0.005) and the no-regulation condition (mean difference:
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Figure 5. Acceptance rates for each condition and manipulation check. Error
bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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1.441, p = 0.009), and there is no difference between the other conditions
(mean difference: –0.244, p = 0.9653). No signiﬁcant main effect of the
manipulation check was found for intrusiveness rate (F(1, 686) = 0.248, p =
0.619, η = 0.000) and no signiﬁcant interaction effect between condition and
manipulation check was found (F(2, 686) = 2.627, p = 0.073, η = 0.008).
Effect of pro-social versus pro-self domain
Data pooled across all conditions for the two scenarios a priori categorized as
pro-self showed a higher acceptance rate (n = 692, M = 2.47, SD = 2.49) com-
pared to two scenarios a priori categorized as pro-social (n = 692, M = 1.65,
SD = 3.15) (t(691) = –6.822, p < 0.001, d = 0.260).
Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 7, the pro-self scenarios had a signiﬁ-
cantly greater acceptance rate (n = 230, M = 2.64, SD = 2.39) compared to pro-
social scenarios (n = 230, M = 1.86, SD = 3.10) in the control condition (t(229)
= –3.928, p < 0.001, d = 0.260). The pro-self scenarios also had a signiﬁcantly
greater acceptance rate (n = 227, M = 2.77, SD = 2.49) compared to pro-social
scenarios (n = 227, M = 1.84, SD = 3.05) in the no-regulation condition (t(226)
= –4.406, p < 0.001, d = 0.293), and pro-self scenarios (n = 235, M = 2.02, SD
= 2.52) had a signiﬁcantly greater acceptance rate compared to pro-social scen-
arios (n = 235, M = 1.26, SD = 3.27) in the legislation-as-alternative condition
(t(234) = –3.503, p = 0.001, d = 0.229).
Pro-self scenarios (data pooled across all conditions for the two scenarios
a priori categorized as pro-self) had a greater intrusiveness rate (n = 692,
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Figure 6. Intrusiveness rates for each condition and manipulation check. Error
bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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M= –1.31, SD = 2.65) compared to the two scenarios a priori categorized as
pro-social (n = 692, M = –0.37, SD = 3.09) (t(691) = –8.142, p < 0.001, d =
0.310).
Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 8, the pro-self scenarios had a signiﬁ-
cantly greater intrusiveness rate (n = 230, M = –1.54, SD = 2.54) compared to
pro-social scenarios (n = 230, M = –0.53, SD = 3.13) in the control condition
(t(229) = –5.016, p < 0.001, d = 0.331). The pro-self scenarios also had a sign-
iﬁcantly greater intrusiveness rate (n = 227, M = –1.60, SD = 2.65) compared to
pro-social scenarios (n = 227, M = –0.58, SD = 3.05) in the no-regulation con-
dition (t(226) = 5.098, p < 0.001, d = 0.339), and pro-self scenarios (n = 235,
M = –0.80, SD = 2.69) had a signiﬁcantly greater intrusiveness rate compared
to pro-social scenarios (n = 235, M = –0.02, SD = 3.05) in the legislation-as-
alternative condition (t(234) = 3.979, p = 0.001, d = 0.260).
Effects of individual differences
In order to investigate individual factors that may affect acceptance rates, a
multiple regression was conducted (Table 5). In the regression, a dummy vari-
able for the no-regulation condition (1/0) and the legislation-as-alternative con-
dition (1/0), manipulation check (1/0) and a dummy variable for higher
education (1/0) were included, along with control variables for age, gender,
individualism, egalitarianism, intuitive decision style and rational decision
style.
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Figure 7. Acceptance rates of pro-social and pro-self nudges divided by
condition. Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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The results show that 17.4% of the variance could be explained with four
variables (F(9, 677) = 14.283, p < 0.001) where the acceptance rate was
lower in the legislation-as-alternative condition (β = –1.733, p < 0.001).
The acceptance rate was also lower for more individualistic participants
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Figure 8. Intrusiveness rates of pro-social and pro-self nudges divided by
condition. Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Table 5. Linear regression analyses exploring the inﬂuences of individual
differences on acceptance rate.
Conﬁdence interval
β (standardized) p-valueβ Lower bound Upper bound
No-regulation (dummy) –0.264 –1.073 0.546 –0.026 0.523
Legislation (dummy) –1.733 –2.620 –0.847 –0.174 <0.001
Manipulation check 0.901 0.166 1.637 0.095 0.016
Higher education (dummy) –0.214 –0.899 0.472 –0.023 0.541
Female 0.511 –0.168 1.191 0.054 0.140
Age –0.016 –0.042 0.009 –0.044 0.208
Individualist –0.522 –0.623 –0.420 –0.379 <0.001
Egalitarian 0.292 0.151 0.433 0.155 <0.001
Rational decision style 0.065 –0.052 0.182 0.041 0.276
Intuitive decision style 0.082 –0.023 0.187 0.060 0.124
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(β = –0.522, p < 0.001) and more egalitarian participants had a greater accept-
ance rate (β = 0.292, p < 0.001), along with the participants who answered cor-
rectly on the manipulation check (β = 0.901, p = 0.016), with no other
signiﬁcant effects for the other variables. The ﬁnding from Study 1 that more
individualistic (and egalitarian) participants differed in their acceptance
rating in the legislation-as-alternative condition compared to the other
conditions was not replicated.
A similar analysis was run for intrusiveness (Table 6). The results show
that 16.0% of the variance could be explained with two variables (R2 =
0.160, F(9, 677) = 12.938, p < 0.001). The intrusiveness rate was greater in
the legislation-as-alternative condition (β = 1.370, p = 0.004) and the intrusive-
ness rate was also higher for more individualistic participants (β = 0.547,
p < 0.001), with no other signiﬁcant effects for the other variables. The
ﬁnding from Study 1 that more individualistic (and egalitarian) participants
differed in their intrusiveness rating in the legislation-as-alternative condition
compared to the other conditions was not replicated.
In summary, Study 2 replicates and strengthens the ﬁndings from Study 1
that, contrary to our original predictions, the legislation-as-alternative condi-
tion was rated as least accepted and as most intrusive. We ﬁnd that this
pattern holds for both pro-social and pro-self scenarios. Importantly, the
main effect including all participants (an intention-to-treat analysis) holds for
both participants who answered the manipulation check correctly and for
the participants who answer incorrectly. Even if we ﬁnd a main effect of the
manipulation check question with participants who answered correctly
Table 6. Linear regression analyses exploring the inﬂuences of individual
differences on intrusiveness rate.
Conﬁdence interval
β (standardized) p-valueβ Lower bound Upper bound
No-regulation (dummy) 0.166 –0.680 1.012 0.016 0.700
Legislation (dummy) 1.370 0.443 2.297 0.133 0.004
Manipulation check –0.122 –0.891 0.647 –0.012 0.755
Higher education (dummy) 0.314 –0.402 1.031 0.032 0.389
Female –0.124 –0.834 0.587 –0.013 0.733
Age 0.007 –0.020 0.034 0.019 0.603
Individualist 0.547 0.441 0.654 0.384 <0.001
Egalitarian –0.141 –0.289 0.007 –0.072 0.061
Rational decision style –0.084 –0.207 0.039 –0.051 0.179
Intuitive decision style –0.109 –0.218 0.001 –0.076 0.052
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rating acceptance as higher, the general pattern that legislation as alternative is
least accepted holds for both groups of participants.
General discussion and conclusions
In this study, we set out to examine whether providing explicit information
about the alternatives to nudges would change the acceptability of nudges.
We expected that making legislation a salient alternative would make nudges
more acceptable compared to providing no information or giving information
that everything would stay the same (since the nudge would be a less paternal-
istic alternative compared to legislation). However, we found no difference in
acceptance when we provided explicit information about the alternative and an
effect in the opposite direction for perceived intrusiveness to freedom of choice
in Study 1. We replicated and strengthened these ﬁndings in Study 2 using both
a different dependent variable (interval scale rather than binary choice) and
manipulation checks. In Study 2, we found that the legislation-as-alternative
condition was rated as the least accepted and most intrusive (both for partici-
pants who passed and those who failed the manipulation check). Thus, two
studies using large representative samples show results that are opposite to
what we predicted. How can these results be understood?
One interpretation of our results is that the respondents might use a form of
heuristic responding induced by the alternative. Relevant here is the affect heur-
istic (Slovic et al., 2002; Slovic & Västfjäll, 2010), which has shown that
people, instead of using careful analysis, rely on their feelings when making
judgments (Västfjäll et al., 2014, 2016). For instance, when people are asked
to judge the risk versus beneﬁt of an activity, they draw on their general affect-
ive feelings (good/bad) for the activity rather than carefully analyzing the pros
and cons of that activity. Slovic et al. (2002), for instance, found that people
used the affect heuristic when making judgments about the risks and beneﬁts
of activities and technologies (e.g., nuclear power). A main ﬁnding was that
people who associate negative feelings with nuclear energy see the technology
as having little beneﬁt and of high risk. People who instead have positive feel-
ings associated with nuclear energy judge the activity to be beneﬁcial and of
low risk. It is possible that our manipulation worked in a similar way:
simply presenting the nudge together with legislation (something that people
could possibly associate with negative feelings) decreases the attractiveness
of the nudge. Similarly, presenting a nudge next to the status quo alternative
(nothing would happen), which arguably most people who dislike paternalism
would associate with positive feelings, could spill over to the nudge, effectively
making it more attractive.
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Another possibility is that salient alternatives may be used in different ways
by different individuals. It is likely that some individuals favor legislation and
therefore might be willing to reject the nudge. If people think the behavior is
important enough to promote, then they might ﬁnd the tradeoff between pater-
nalism and efﬁciency to be ﬁne, assuming that most people think that legisla-
tion is more effective then nudges. This could be especially relevant to the
Swedish context, where citizens historically have had a high level of trust
that the government will act in the best interests of its citizens. Effectiveness
has been shown to increase the acceptance of nudges (Petrescu et al., 2016).
If the group that accepts the nudge in the legislation-as-alternative condition
(to avoid legislation) is of similar size to the group that would rather see legis-
lation instead of a nudge (i.e., rejecting the nudge in favor of legislation), the net
effect would be zero. If this was the case, then this should be possible to capture
indirectly with our individualistic measure. In Study 1, we found that that more
(compared to less) individualistic participants had a lower level of acceptance
for nudges in the control and no-regulation scenarios, and acceptance was
highest when legislation was the alternative. However, the pattern is reversed
for less individualistic participants. In Study 2, we instead found that,
overall, more individualistic participants were less accepting across the manip-
ulations (replicating Hagman et al., 2015). These ﬁndings suggest that individ-
ual differences (especially individualistic versus collectivistic worldviews) are
important for general acceptance and perceived intrusiveness of nudges and
that, furthermore, individual differences may sometimes interact with informa-
tion about policy alternatives. Thus, an important lesson for policy is that ‘one
nudge does not ﬁt all’ (Hagman et al., 2015) – that sometimes the same infor-
mation will be differently received by different people. This result is consistent
with previous research showing the importance of worldviews/values for atti-
tudes toward nudges (Hagman et al., 2015; Jung & Mellers, 2016) and also
relates to the notion that the political afﬁliation of the sender proposing a
nudge, as well as the worldview of the receiver of the nudge policy, jointly
determine acceptability (Tannebaum et al., 2017).
Importantly, though, we replicate the ﬁnding that pro-self nudges overall are
more acceptable compared to pro-social nudges (Hagman et al., 2015). Thus,
in spite of the overall high level of acceptance of nudges (Sunstein, 2017a),
interventions aimed at promoting predominantly private welfare are preferred
over interventions aimed at promoting predominantly social welfare. This
ﬁnding suggests that policy-makers will be more successful in implementing
pro-self nudges. Additionally, information campaigns highlighting the beneﬁt
for the individual rather than society may increase acceptance of policy
changes.
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An important possible limiting condition for this research is that we only
conducted our studies in a Swedish sample. Even though previous research
has reported a rather homogenous view on different nudges in Europe
(Sunstein, 2017a) or when comparing Swedish and US samples (Hagman
et al., 2015), it is very possible that the effect of more paternalistic alternatives
would be different in societies that are more focused on individualistic motives.
Sweden has had a longstanding tradition involving a strong welfare state
emphasizing collective and uniform solutions throughout the public sector.
In contrast, the political discourse in, for example, the USA has traditionally
emphasized more liberal values related to freedom of choice. Thus, an import-
ant task for future research is to examine whether the effects of alternatives
found in a Swedish context translate to other cultures.
In summary, this study set out to demonstrate that comparing a nudge to an
explicit alternative that is more paternalistic (legislation) or less paternalistic
(no regulation at all) should systematically affect acceptability. However, we
found surprisingly little effect on the overall acceptance of nudges regardless
of the alternative, and when we found an effect, it was in the opposite direction
to our prediction – when the alternative to the nudge is legislation, acceptance
decreases. While these ﬁndings must be replicated and extended, an interesting
implication of our study is that acceptance of nudges may not always automat-
ically increase when legislation is added as an alternative or used as a reference
point.
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